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Abstract-In thii paper, we introduce and study a class of constrained multiobjective games in 
locally L-convex spaces without linear structure. A new fixed-point theorem for a family of set- 
valued mappings and an existence theorem of solutions for a system of quasi-equilibrium problems 
are first proved in noncompact locally L-convex spaces. As applications, several existence theorems 
of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games are es- 
tablished in noncompact locally L-convex spaces. These theorems improve, unify, and generalize the 
corresponding results of the multiobjective games in recent literature. @ 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All 
rights reserved. 
Keywords-Locally L-convex space, Collectively fixed point, System of quasi-equilibrium prob- 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of an equilibrium point for an n-person game was first introduced by Nash [1,2], 
who established the existence of the equilibrium point under certain assumptions. Since then, 
the Nash equilibrium problem for n-person games has been intensively studied and extended by 
a number of authors under various assumptions and different directions. The constrained games 
with finite or infinite players are important generalizations of n-person games which have been 
widely studied by many authors. 
In recent years, much attention has been focused on the game problems with vector payoffs 
in game theory; for example, see [3-161 and the references therein. One of the reasons is that 
multicriteria models can be better applied to real-world situations. The motivation for the study 
of multicriteria models can be found in [3-5). The existence of Pareto equilibria is one of the 
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fundamental problems. Hence, in order to guarantee the existence of Pareto equilibria of the 
multiobjective games without constraints, some sufficient conditions have been given by several 
authors; for example, see [9,10,12-141. 
Recently, Wang [ll] and Ding [15,16] introduced and studied a class of constrained multiob- 
jective games which include the multiobjective games as special cases. Some existence theorems 
of weighted Nash equilibria and Pareto equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games were 
established under different assumptions in topological vector spaces, H-spaces, and general topo- 
logical spaces, respectively. 
In this paper, we will continue to study the constrained multiobjective games in locally 
L-convex spaces without linear structure. A collectively fixed-point theorem for a family of 
set-valued mappings and an existence theorem of solutions for a system of quasiequilibrium prob- 
lems are first proved in a noncompact locally L-convex space without linear structure. Then, 
by employing the existence result, several existence theorems of weighted Nash-equilibria and 
Pareto equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games are established in noncompact locally 
L-convex spaces. These theorems improve, unify, and generalize the corresponding existence 
results of Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games in recent literature. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
For a set X, we shall denote by 2* and F(X) the family of all subsets of X and the family of all 
nonempty finite subsets of X, respectively. For A E F(X), we denote by (Al the cardinality of A. 
Let A,, be the standard n-dimensional simplex with vertices ee, er , , . . , e,. If J is a nonempty 
subset of (0, 1, . . . , n}, we denote by AJ the convex hull of the vertices {ej : j E J}. A topological 
space X is said to be contractible if the identity mapping IX on X is homotopic to a constant 
function. A topological space X is said to be acyclic if all of its reduced Cech homology groups 
over the rationals vanish. In particular, any contractible space is acyclic, and hence, any convex 
or star-shaped set in a topological vector space is acyclic. 
The notion of an L-convex space was introduced by Ben-ElAMechaiekh et al. [17]. Let X be a 
topological space and I’ : F(X) --) 2 * be a set-valued mapping such that the following condition 
holds: 
(1) for each A E F(X) with IAl = n + 1, there exists a continuous mapping 4~ : A,, + r(A) 
such that for each B E F(A) with ]B] = ]J] + 1, $A(AJ) C I’(B), where AJ denotes the 
face of A, corresponding B. 
Then, the pair (X, I’) is called an L-convex space. A subset D of (X, P) is said to be L-convex 
if for each A E F(D), l?(A) c D. D is called L-compact if there exists a compact L-convex 
subset E of X containing D. 
An L-convex space (X, I’) is said to be a locally L-convex space, denoted by (X, I’, U), if X 
is a uniform topological space with a uniform structure U having an open base ,0 of symmetric 
entourages such that for each 5 E X and for each U E U, the set U(z) = {y E X : (y,z) E U} is 
L-convex. 
L-convex spaces include H-spaces (see [18,19]), G-convex spaces (see [20,21]), and many topo 
logical spaces with abstract convexity structure as special cases; see [17,20,21] and the references 
therein. The notion of locally L-convex spaces generalizes the notions of locally convex H-spaces 
and locally G-convex spaces introduced by Wu and Li [22] and Yuan [23], respectively. 
The following notions were introduced by Tian and Zhou 1241. If X and Y are two topological 
spaces, G : X + 2 y is a set-valued mapping. A function f : X x Y -+ R U {foe} is said 
to be transfer upper (respectively, lower) continuous in (z, y) with respect to G if, for every 
(2, y) E X x Y with y E G(z), f(s, z) > f(z, y) (respectively, f(z, z) < f(z, y)) for some 
.z E G(z) implies that there exist a point z’ E Y and a neighborhood N(s, y) of (5, y) such that 
for any (z’, y’) E N(z, y) with y’ E G(z’), f(z’, z’) > f(z’, y’) (respectively, f(z’, z’) < f(r’, y’)) 
and z’ E G(z’). f(z, y) is said to be transfer upper (respectively, lower) continuous in (z, y) 
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with respect to D c X if, for each (x, y) E X x Y with y E D, f(x, z) > f(z, y) (respectively, 
f(z, z) < f(s, 9)) for some z E D, there exist a point z’ E Y and a neighborhood N(x, y) of (z, y) 
such that for any (x’, y’) E N(z, y), f(x’, z’) > f(z’, y’) (respectively, f(x’, z’) < f(x’, y’)) and 
z’ E D. I 
LEMMA 2.1. (See [24, p. 2961.) Let X and Y be two topological spaces. Let G : X --f 2y be a set- 
valued mapping with nonempty compact values and closed graph, and Jet f : X x Y ---f RU { foe} 
be transfer upper continuous in (x, y) with respect to G. Then the set-valued mapping M :X -> 2l 
defined bv 
M(x) = Y E G(x) : f(x, Y) = & fb, z) > vx E x 
is nonempty compact-valued and has closed graph. If, in addition, G is upper semicontinuous. 
then M is also upper semicontinuous. 
Let X and Y be two topological spaces. Since the class I-I: (X, Y) of admissible set-valued 
mappings introduced by Park and Kim [20,21] includes the class of upper semicontinuous set- 
valued mappings with compact acyclic values as special cases, by Corollary 3.3 of Ding [25], we 
have the following result. 
LEMMA 2.2. Let (X,I’,U) be a locally L-convex space, D be an L-compact subset of X, and 
G:X-+2 D be a upper se micontinuous set-vaJued mapping with closed acyclic values. Then G 
has a fixed point in D; i.e., there exists an P E D such that P E G(i). 
3. FIXED POINT AND QUASIEQUILIBRIA 
In this section, we shall prove a collectively fixed-point theorem for a family of set-valued 
mappings defined on the product space of locally L-convex spaces and an existence theorem of 
solutions for a system of quasiequilibrium problems in noncompact locally L-convex spaces. 
Let I be a finite or infinite index set and let {Xi}ie~ be a family of sets. Let X = ni,, X, 
and Xi = n,eIjiti Xj. For each fixed i E 1 and x E X, we write x = (x2, xi) = (x,)ie~ where zz 
and xi denote the projection of x onto Xi and X,, respectively. 
THEOREM 3.1. Let (X,, Pi, U2)ie1 be a family of locally L-convex spaces with each Ui having an 
open basis 6, of symmetric entourages. For each i E I, Jet D, be an L-compact subset of X, and 
G, : Xi + 2 Di be an upper semicontinuous set-valued mapping with nonempty closed values. 
Suppose that one of the following conditions holds: 
(1) for each i E I and for each x2 E Xi, Gi(x”) is acycJic, if I is finite; 
(2) for each x E X, Hi,, Gi(xi) is an acyclic subset of X = I&,, Xi, if I is infinite. 
Then there exists a point f = (&)ieI E ni,, D, such that ?i E Gi(5?) for each i E I. 
PROOF. Let X = ni,, Xi. For each ni,, Vi E l-Ii,, pi, define 
Vn,,, ui = {(x, y) E X x X : (xi, yi) E U,, for all i E I}. 
Then the family U = {VII,, u, : ni,, Vi E &,,UZ} is an open basis of symmetric entourages 
for the product uniformity, and associated uniform topology on X = fl,,, X, is the product 
of the uniform topologies on Xi for i E I. Let X = ni,, Xi be equipped with the product 
uniform topology and for each i E 1, let 7ri : X -+ Xi be the projection of X onto X,. Define 
I? : F(X) -+ 2x \ (0) by 
r(A) = ~Wd4). VA E 3(X) 
%EI 
Following the idea of Tan and Zhang [26], we first show that (X., I?, U) is a locally L-convex 
space. Suppose A = {aalar,. ,an} E F(X) where for each k = O,l, . ,n, ak = nzEI xk,?. 
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For any fixed i E I, let Ai = ni(A) = {zpo,i,. . . ,ccpcp,~,,,~} where 0 5 pc < ... < p,(i) 5 n 
and xpo,i, . . . , xpcp,(,) ,i are all distinct. Since Ai E 3(Xi), there exists a continuous function q& : 
A,(i) --+ ri(At) such that for each 0 5 Pjo < ... < Pj,,, 5 p,(i), @i(L) C I’i({~p,,,i,. . ,xpj,,i)) 
where A,,, is the standard m- dimensional simplex with vertices ej,, . . . , ej,. For each s = 
0 7 ’ . . , q(i), let Ji(p,) = {t E {O,l,. . . , n} : ~t,i = xp,,i}. Define mapping $Q : A, -+ Acl(i) by 
!bi(~O,~l,.~.,~?x) = c at, c at,..., c Qt > 
tE J(Po) tE J(m) tE J(w) 
for all (~0,. , a,) E A,. Clearly, $i is continuous. 
Now define a mapping 9 : A, -+ I’(A) by 
4(a) = (4% O $Ji((ll))iEI, V’acA, 
It is clear that 4 is continuous. It is easy to check that for each 0 5 ic < . ’ . < ik < n, 
This proves that (X, l?, U) is an L-convex space. For each x = (xa)ier E X and for each U E U, 
we have 
V(x)={yEX:(x,y)EU}={yEX:(xi,yi)EUi, foralliE1) 
= {y E X : yi E Ui(xi), for all i E I} = j--J U,(x,). 
iEI 
For each A E .F(U(x)) = F(&IUi(zi)), we have that for each i E I, ni(A) & Ut(xi). Since 
each Ui(xi) is an L-convex subset of (Xi,I’i,Ui), we obtain l?i(ri(A)) C Ui(xi). It follows that 
r(A) = p?,(?r,(A)) c I-&(Xi) = U(x). 
iEI iEI 
This shows that U(s) is an L-convex subset of (X, r, U). So the product space (X, r, U) of locally 
L-convex spaces (Xi, l?i, Ui) is also a locally L-convex space. Let D = ni,, Di. Then D is also 
an L-compact subset of X. Define a set-valued mapping G : X + 2O by 
G(x) = nGi (xi), VXEX. 
iEI 
Since each Gi is upper semicontinuous with nonempty compact values, by Lemma 3 of [27], G is 
also upper semicontinuous with nonempty compact values. If I is finite, by Condition (1) and 
the Kiinneth formula (see [28]), G h as acyclic values; if I is infinite, by Condition (2), G also has 
acyclic values. All conditions of Lemma 2.2 are satisfied. By Lemma 2.2, there exists a point 
f = (?i)iEl E l-Ii,, Di SU& that 2 E G(g) = ni,, Ga(gi); i.e., fi E Gi(f”) for all i E 1. 
REMARK 3.1. From the proof of Theorem 3.1, it is easy to see that if, in Theorem 3.1, Gi : 
xi + 2X* is replaced by Gi : X -+ 2 xi for each i E 1, then the following conclusion still holds: 
there exists a point ? E X such that Pi E Gi(?) for each i E I. The results closely related to 
Theorem 3.1 may consult Theorem 1 of [29] and Theorems 1 and 1’ of [30]. If each Gi(x) has 
convex values and each Xi is a nonempty convex subset of a locally convex topological vector 
space, then Theorem 3.1 reduces to Theorem 5 of [31]. Theorem 3.1 is closed related to some 
well-known results of [32-341. 
From Theorem 3.1, we obtain the following vonNeumann-type intersection theorem. 
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THEOREM 3.2. Let (Xi, ri,Ui)iE1 be a family of compact locally L-convex spaces with each M, 
having an open basis /?i of symmetric entourages. Let {Ai}iEr be a family of closed subsets of X 
such that one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
(1) for each i E I and xi E Xi, {yi E Xi : (~?,yi) E Ai} is a nonempty acyclic subset of D,, 
if I is finite; 
(2) for each z E X, fiiE1{y E Xi : (z”, vi) E Ai} . IS an acyclic subset of X if I is infinite. 
Then ni,, Ai # 0. 
PROOF. For each i E I, define a set-valued mapping G, : Xi -+ 2x1 by G%(?) = {yz E X, : 
(xa, yi) E Ai} for each xi E X”. Since the graph Gr(Gi) = Ai is closed in (X’, Xi) = X and X, 
is compact, it follows that Gi is upper semicontinuous on X2 with nonempty closed values. 
Conditions (1) and (2) imply that Conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 3.1 hold. By Theorem 3.1 
with Di = X, for each i E I, there exists f = (Zi, 5i) E ni,, Xi such that 2% E Gi(?) for each 
i E I; i.e., d E A, for each i E I and so &,, Ai # 8. 
REMARK 3.2. Theorem 3.2 is a variant version of Theorems 2 and 2’ of [30] in locally L-convex 
spaces which, in turn, generalizes the intersection theorem of [32]. 
THEOREM 3.3. Let (Xi, JI’i,Ui)iel be a family of locally L-convex spaces with each L& having an 
open basis pi of symmetric entourages. For each i E I, let Di be an L-compact subset of X,: 
A, : Xi --f 2Ds be an upper semicontinuous set-valued mapping with nonempty closed values. 
and 4% : X = Xi x Xi -+ R be a function such that 
(i) for each i E I, &(z’, xi) is transfer lower continuous in (z’, xi) with respect to A,; 
(ii) one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
(a) for each i E I and zi E X’, the set {yi E Ai : #J%(?, yz) = inf,T,AT(,,j &(x2, 2,)) is 
acyclic if I is finite; 
(b) for each z E X, the set flicl{yi E A2(x2) : &(zi, yz) = inf,,,A.(Z8) &(?. z,)} is 
acyclic if I is infinite. 
Then there exists a point 2 = (Y, 2%) E D = nzEI D, such that for each i E I, 
PROOF. For each i E I, define a set-valued mapping Gi : Xi -+ 2D” by 
Gi (xi) = yi E Ai (zi) : 4i (s~,Y~) = ziJ&j 4% Cxij zi) 
> 
= yi E Ai (xi) : -c#J~ (~?,yi) = ,,~~r;ziI (-dJi (xi, G)) , for each zZ E X” 
1 ! 
By Condition (i), --d,( i z.) ’ t z x , z 1s ransfer upper continuous in (xi, xi) with respect to A,. Since, for 
each i E I and xi E Xi, Ai is closed and it is contained in a compact L-convex subset of X,. 
therefore, Ai has compact values. From Lemma 2.1, it follows that Gi is upper semicontinuous 
with nonempty compact values. Conditions (ii)(a) and (ii)(b) imply Conditions (1) and (2) of 
Theorem 3.1 hold, respectively. By Theorem 3.1, there exists a point P = (&, Zi) E D such that 
5, E Gi(?‘) for each i E I. Hence, we obtain for each i E I, 
REMARK 3.3. Theorem 3.3 is an improved version of Theorem 6 of [30] in locally L-convex 
spaces without linear structure. Theorem 3.3 generalizes Theorem 9.3.3 of Aubin [36] and The- 
orem 6.4.23 of Aubin and Ekeland 1371 to noncompact locally L-convex spaces without linear 
structure under very weak assumptions. 
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4. CONSTRAINED MULTIOBJECTIVE GAME 
In this section, we shall consider a constrained game with finite or infinite players and mul- 
ticriteria in its strategic form P = (Xi, Ai, Fi)iE1. For each player i E I, Xi is its strategy set; 
Aj : Xi + zx” is its constrained correspondence which restricts the strategies of the ith player 
to the subset Ai c Xi when all the other players have chosen their strategies xj E Xj, j # i, 
and F, = (fi,l, f~, . . . , fi,k;) : X + Rk” is its payoff function (or say, loss function or multicrite- 
ria), where Ici is a positive integer. In such a constrained multiobjective game, the other players 
influence player j E I 
(a) indirectly, by restricting j’s feasible strategies to Aj(d), 
(b) directly, by affecting j’s payoff function Fj. 
If a strategy z = (zi)ie~ E X is played, each player i is trying to minimize her/his payoff 
function Fi(x) = (fi,l(z), f&x), .  .  .  ,f+i(x)), which consists of noncommensurable outcomes. 
Each player i has a preference ki over the outcome space Rki. For each player i E I, its 
preference ki is given as 
~1 ki ~2 if and only if .Zi,j 2 ~s,j, Vj=1,2 ,..., lci, 
where zi = (zi,i, 2r,z, . . . ,.zi,ki) and ts = (ts,i,~z,z,. . . , .~z,k~) are any elements in Rki. The 
players’ preference relations induce the preference on X, defined for each player i, and choose 
x = (X&I and Y  = (yi)w by 
z & y whenever Fi(x) & Fi(y). 
In the constrained multiobjective game, each player i E I is trying to minimize her/his own payoff 
function according to her/his preferences. 
The constrained multiobjective game has been studied by Wang and Li [ll] and Ding [15,16]. 
Some existence theorems of weighted Nash equilibria and Pareto equilibria have been obtained 
under different assumptions. 
If I is finite and Ai = Xi for each i E I and for all xi E Xi, thenthe model of constrained 
multiobjective games reduces to the model of multicriteria games G = (Xi, Fi)gl studied by 
Wang (9,101, Ding 1121, Yuan and Tarafdar [13], and Yu and Yuan (141. If for each player i E 1, 
Fi(x) = fi(x), i.e., ki = 1, which consists of commensurable outcomes, then the model of the con- 
strained multiobjective games reduces to the model of the constrained games (or say, metagames) 
studied by Aubin [36, pp. 282-2831, Aubin and Ekeland [37, pp. 350-3511, Ding [38,39], Tian [40], 
and Yuan, Issc, Tan and Yu [41]. 
For the games with vector payoff functions (or say, multicriteria), it is well known that in 
general there does not exist a strategy f E X to minimize (or equivalently to say, maximize) 
all fi,js for each player i E I; for example, see reference [7]. Hence, we need to give some 
concepts of solutions of the constrained multiobjective games. Throughout this paper, for each 
given positive integer m, we shall denote by Ry the nonnegative orthant of Rm, i.e., 
R~={u=(u1,u2,..., u,) E Rm : Uj > 0, Vj = 1,2,. . .m}, 
so that the nonnegative orthant RI;” of R” has a nonempty interior with the topology induced 
in terms of convergence of vectors with respect to the Euclidean metric. That is, 
intRy={u=(ui,uz ,..., Um)ERm:uj>0,Vj=1,2,...,m}. 
We denote by T+” and int T+” the simplex of R;” and its relative interior, respectively; i.e., 
T,“= 
{ 
u=(211,~2,...,~,)ER;:~uj=1 7 
j=l 1 
1 
m 
intT+m= u=(ui,uz ,..., u,)EintRT: ZL~ 1 . c -= } 
j=l 
Now we have the following definitions. 
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DEFINITION 4.1. A strategy & E Xi of player i is said to be a Pareto eficient strategy (respec- 
tively, a weals Pareto eficient strategy) with respect to i E X of the constrained multiobjective 
game r = (X,, Ai, Fi)m if & E A(hi) and there is no strategy zi E A(?‘) such that 
(respectively, F, (2) - F, (z,, 2%) E int R>) 
DEFINITION 4.2. A strategy i E X is said to be a Pareto equilibrium (respectively, a weals Pareto 
equilibrium) of the constrained multiobjective game r = (Xi, Ai, Fi)iEl if, for each player i E I. 
f, E A,(?“) is a Pareto efficient strategy (respectively, a weak Pareto efficient strategy) with 
respect to i. 
From the above definitions, it is clear that each Pareto equilibrium is a weak Pareto equilibrium, 
but the converse is not always true, We also need the following definition. The idea is from that 
of Wang [g-11]. 
DEFINITION 4.3. A strategy f E X is said to be a weighted Nash equilibrium with respect to 
the weighted vector W = (Wi)icl with Wi = (Wi,l, WQ, . . , Wi,k,) E Rk+ of the constrained 
multiobjective game (Xi, Ai, Fi)iEr if for each player i E I, we have 
(1) 2% E Ai( 
(2) W, E R'"+ \ (0); 
(3) Wi. F,(i) 5 Wi. Fi(ii,zi), ‘d~i E Ai( 
where denotes the inner product in Rk”. 
REMARK 4.1. In particular, if Wi E T? for each i E I, then the strategy li E X is said to be 
a normalized weighted Nash equilibrium with respect to W. From the definitions above, it is 
not difficult to verify that a strategy 5 E X is a weighted Nash equilibrium with respect to the 
weighted vector W = (Wi)i,r of the game I’ = (Xi,Ai, Fi)iEl if and only if C? E X is an optimal 
solution of the following system of quasi-equilibrium problems: find i E X such that for each 
i E N. 
As an application of Theorem 3.3, we have the following existence theorems of the weighted 
Nash equilibrium for the constrained multiobjective game. 
THEOREM 4.1. Let IY = (Xi, Ai, Fi)iEl be a constrained multiobjective game where (Xi,rz,Uz) 
is a locally L-convex space with open basis pi of symmetric entourages. For each player i E I, 
A, : X” --+ 2*” is the constrained correspondence where Di is an L-compact subset of X, and 
F, = (fi,lrfq2,. ,fi,k,) : X -+ Rk” is the payoff function. Suppose that there exists a weighted 
vector W = (Wi)iEI with Wi E Rk’ \ (0) such that for each i E I, 
(i) A, is upper semicontinuous on X” with nonempty closed values; 
(ii) the function #i : X = Xi x Xi -+ R defined by &( x’, xi) = Wi F~(x’, xi) is transfer lower 
continuous in (xi, Q) with respect to A,; 
(iii) one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
(a) for each i E I, the set {yi E Ai : ~$%(x~,yi) = inf =,EA,(~~) 4i(Xz, Zi)} is acyclic if I 
is finite; 
(b) for each x E X, the set fliE1{yi E Ai : 4(xi, yi) = inf,,,A,(zz) 4(x2, zi)} is acyclic 
if I is infinite. 
Then I’ has at least one weighted Nash equilibrium point f E D = ni,, Di with respect to the 
weighted vector W. 
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PROOF. It is easy to see that for each i E I, Ai and di satisfy all conditions of Theorem 3.3. By 
Theorem 3.3, there exists a point f E D = &,, Di such that for each i E I, 
Hence, we have that for each i E I, 
i.e., f E D is a weighted Nash equilibrium point of l? with respect to the weighted vector W. 
REMARK 4.2. If (Xi,I’i,Ui) is a compact locally L-convex space for each i E I, then, letting 
Di = Xi for each i E I, the conclusion of Theorem 4.1 holds obviously. We emphasize that for 
each i E I, the constrained correspondence Ai and the payoff function Fi = (fi,l, fi,z, , . , fi,k;) 
may not be continuous. If for each i E I, Ai and Fi are both continuous, then Conditions (i) 
and (ii) of Theorem 4.1 are satisfied automatically. Hence, Theorem 4.1 improves and generalizes 
Theorem 3.1 of [ll], Theorem 1 of [14], and Theorem 3.1 of [lo] from compact setting of locally 
convex topological vector spaces to noncompact locally L-convex spaces without linear structure 
and from the multiobjective game with finite players to the constrained multiobjective game with 
infinite players. When I is finite, Theorem 4.1 is a new result which is different from Theorem 3.1 
of [15] and Theorem 4.1 of [16], since, for each i E I, the inverse mapping (Ai)-’ of the constrained 
correspondence Ai may not be open-valued. 
COROLLARY 4.1. Let I? = (Xi, Ai, Fi)ieI be a constrained multiobjective game where Xi is a 
nonempty convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space Ei. For each i E I, let Di 
be a nonempty compact subset of Xi, Ai : Xi -+ 2O” be the constrained correspondence, and 
Fi = (fi,l, fi,2, * . .T fi,k;) : X + Rk’ be the payoff function. Suppose that there exists a weighted 
vector W = (Wi)ier with Wi E Rk’ \ (0) such that for each i E I, 
(i) Ai is upper semicontinuous on Xi with nonempty closed convex values; 
(ii) the function & : X = Xi x Xi --) R defined by &(z?, xi) = Wi. Fi(Xi, xi) is transfer lower 
continuous in (zi, xi) with respect to Ai; 
(iii) for each i E I and each xi E X2, the function yi ti $i(x’, yi) is quasiconvex. 
Then the r has at least one weighted Nash equilibrium point P E D = fli,, Di with respect to 
the weighted vector W. 
PROOF. Note that each nonempty convex subset Xi in locally convex topological vector spaces 
has a uniform structure Ui with an open basis pi of symmetric entourages which is induced by 
the family of seminorms. On the other hand, for each & E S(Xi), let I’i(Bi) = CO Bi. Then each 
(Xi, ri, UJ becomes a locally L-convex space. From Condition (iii), it follows that for each i E I 
and xi E Xi, the set 
is convex, and hence, it is acyclic. When I is infinite, we also have the set 
is convex and so it is also acyclic. The conclusion of Corollary 4.1 follows from Theorem 4.1. 
THEOREM 4.2. Let l? = (Xi, Fi)icI be a multiobjective game, where (Xi,I’i,Ui) is a locally 
L-convex space with open basis fli of symmetric entourages. For each i E I, let Di be an 
L-compact closed subset of Xi, and let Fi = (fi,l, f+,2, . . , fi,k;) : X -+ Rki be the payoff function 
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of the ith player. Suppose that there exists a weighted vector W = (Wt)icI with Wi E Rk' \ (0) 
such that for each i E I, 
(i) the function $i : X + R defined by 4i( x2,x,) = W. F%(x’, xi) is transfer lower continuous 
in (x%,xi) with respect to Di; 
(ii) one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
(a) for each i E I and for each zz E X”. the set {g% f D, : 4(x’, yi) = inf&ED, &(?. z,)} 
is acyclic if I is finite; 
(b) for each x E X, the set niE1{yz E Di : &(x2> yz) = inf,,ED, &(x’, 2,)) is acyclic if 1 
is infinite. 
Then r has at least one weighted Nash equilibrium point ? E D = flzEI Di with respect to the 
weighted vector W. 
PROOF. For each i E N and for all zi E X2, let Ai(xc”) = D,. Then the conclusion of Corollary 4.2 
holds from Theorem 4.1. 
COROLLARY 4.2. Let (Xi, Fi)iE, be a multiobjective game, where Xi is a nonempty convex 
subset of a locally convex topological vector space Ei. For each i E I, let Di be a compact subset 
of Xi and Fi = (fi,l,. . . , fi,ki) : X + Rki is the payoff function. Suppose that there exists a 
weighted vector W = (Wi)icl with Wi E R? \ (0) such that for each i E I, 
(i) the function 4% : X’ x Xi -+ R defined by 4i(x”,xi) = W F2(~2,.z:2) is transfer lower 
continuous in (xi, xi) with respect to D,: 
(ii) for each xi E X’, the ‘function yi H 4(x’, yi) is quasiconvex. 
Then l? has at least one weighted Nash equilibrium point i E D with respect to the weighted 
vector W. 
PROOF. In Corollary 4.1, for each i E 1 and x7 E Xi, let A,(P) = D,. Then the conclusion of 
Corollary 4.2 holds from Corollary 4.1. 
REMARK 4.3. Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.2 improve and generalize Theorem 1 of [14], Theo- 
rem 3.1 of [lo], Theorem 1.11 of [3], and Theorem 1 of [6] to noncompact locally L-convex spaces 
under very weak assumptions. 
Now we shall employ the existence result of the weighted Nash equilibrium to deduce some 
existence of Pareto equilibrium for constrained multiobjective games. In order to do so, we first 
need the following lemma which tells us that the existence problems of Pareto equilibrium for con- 
strained multiobjective games can be reduced to the existence of the weighted Nash equilibrium 
under certain circumstances. 
LEMMA 4.1. Each normalized weighted Nash equilibrium i E X with a weight W = (WtjzGI E 
n,,,T$ (respectively W E n,,, int T?) for a constrained multiobjective game r = (Xz, A,. 
Fz)lE~ is a weak Pareto equilibrium (respectively, a Pareto equilibrium) of the game l?. 
PROOF. Noting the definitions of weighted Nash equilibrium and Pareto equilibrium for the 
constrained multiobjective games, by using a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 2.1 
of [lo, pp. 376-3771, it is easy to show that the conclusion of Lemma 4.1 holds, and hence, WI’ 
omit, it. 
REMARK 4.4. We should note that the conclusion of Lemma 4.1 still holds if 2 E X is a weighted 
Nash equilibrium with a weight W E ni,, Ri”+ \ {0} (respectively, W E ni,, int R$) of the 
game l?. It should be also pointed out that a Pareto equilibrium of I? is not necessarily a weighted 
Nash equilibrium of the game I’. 
THEOREM 4.3. Let r = (Xi, Ai, Fi)ier be a constrained multiobjective game where each (X,, rz, 
L4%) is a locally L-convex space. For each i E I, let D, be an L-compact subset of X, and 
A, : X” -+ 2O” be the constrained correspondence and Fi = (fi,l, fi,z, , fi,k,) : X + Rkl be 
the loss function. Suppose that there exists a weighted vector W = (Wi)2E~ with Wi E Rkl \ {0) 
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for each i E I such that Conditions (i)-(iii) of Theorem 4.1 are satisfied. Then I’ has at least a 
weak Pareto equilibrium point.in X. In addition, if W = (Wi)cc~ E &, intT$‘, then r has at 
least a Pareto equilibrium point in D = ni,, Di. 
PROOF. By Theorem 4.1, I? has at least a weighted Nash equilibrium point f E D with respect 
to the weighted vector W. Lemma 4.1 shows that f is also a weak Pareto equilibrium point of I’, 
and a Pareto equilibrium point of I? if W E n,,, int T?. 
As immediate consequences of Theorem 4.3, we can easily obtain the following results. 
COROLLARY 4.3. Let r = (Xi, Ai, Fi)iE~ b e a constrained multiobjective game. For each player 
i E I, its strategy set Xi is a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector Ei, Ai : Xi + 2D” is 
its constrained correspondence where Di is a compact subset of Xi, and Fi = (fi,l, f~, . . . , fi,k,) : 
X -+ Rk” is its payoff function. Suppose that there exists a weighted vector W = (Wi)icl E 
&, Rki \ (0) such that Conditions (i)-(iii) of Corollary 4.1 hold. Then IY has at least a weak 
Pareto equilibrium point 2 E D = JJ,,, Di. Furthermore, if W E ni,, int T$, then r has at 
least a Pareto equilibrium point. 
PROOF. By Corollary 4.1, II’ has at least a weighted Nash equilibrium point f E D with respect 
to the weighted vector W. Now Lemma 4.1 implies that 2 is also a weak Pareto equilibrium point 
of r, and a Pareto equilibrium point of I? if W E niEN int T: 
REMARK 4.5. Theorem 4.3 and Corollary 4.3 generalize Theorem 3.2 of [lo] and Theorem 3.4 
of [ll] in several aspects. 
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